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Correlation-Based Traffic Analysis Attacks  
on Anonymity Networks 
Ye Zhu, Member, IEEE, Xinwen Fu,  Member, IEEE, Bryan Gramham, Member, IEEE,  
Riccardo Bettati, Member, IEEE, and Wei Zhao, Fellow, IEEE  
Abstract—In this paper, we address attacks that exploit the timing behavior of TCP and other protocols and applications in low-latency 
anonymity networks. Mixes have been used in many anonymous communication systems and are supposed to provide 
countermeasures to defeat traffic analysis attacks. In this paper, we focus on a particular class of traffic analysis attacks, flow-
correlation attacks, by which an adversary attempts to analyze the network traffic and correlate the traffic of a flow over an input link 
with that over an output link. Two classes of correlation methods are considered, namely time-domain methods and frequency-domain 
methods. Based on our threat model and known strategies in existing mix networks, we perform extensive experiments to analyze the 
performance of mixes. We find that all but a few batching strategies fail against flow-correlation attacks, allowing the adversary to 
either identify ingress and egress points of a flow or to reconstruct the path used by the flow. Counterintuitively, some batching 
strategies are actually detrimental against attacks. The empirical results provided in this paper give an indication to designers of Mix 
networks about appropriate configurations and mechanisms to be used to counter flow-correlation attacks. 
Index Terms—Privacy, mixes, anonymity, anonymous communication, flow-correlation attack. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
AS the Internet is increasingly used in all aspects of daily life, the realization has emerged that privacy and 
confidentiality are important requirements for the success 
of many applications. It has been shown that, in many 
situations, encryption alone cannot provide the level of 
confidentiality required by users, since traffic analysis can 
easily uncover information about the participants in a 
distributed application. 
User anonymity is one important confidentiality criterion 
for many applications, ranging from peer-to-peer file 
sharing and anonymous web browsing or e-mail, to various 
forms of electronic commerce, and finally to electronic 
voting. The nature of many such applications requires that 
the identity of either one or more of the participants 
remains confidential either from the other participant(s) or 
from third parties. 
The anonymity of a system can be passively attacked by 
an observer in two ways, either through inspection of 
payload or headers of the exchanged data packets, or, when 
encryption is used, through traffic analysis. Sufficiently 
effective encryption can be used to prevent packet content 
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inspection, giving prevalence to the second form of attack. 
Traffic analysis is typically countered by the use of 
intermediary nodes, whose role is to perturb the traffic 
flow and thus confuse an external observer. Such inter­
mediaries (often called mixes) delay and reroute exchanged 
messages, reorder them, pad their size, or perform other 
operations. Chaum [1] proposed such a mix network to 
handle mail traffic. 
The original Chaum mix network operates on entire mail 
messages at a time and therefore does not need to pay 
particular attention to latency added by the mixes. Increas­
ingly, the data exchanged exceed by far the capacity of 
mixes, for example, in file-sharing applications. As a result, 
current mixes operate on individual packets of a flow rather 
than on entire messages. In conjunction with source routing 
at the sender, this allows for very efficient network-level 
implementations of mix networks. 
Mixes are also being used in applications where low 
latency is relevant, for example, voice-over-IP or video 
streaming. Many other applications, such as traditional FTP 
or file-sharing applications, rely on delay-sensitive proto­
cols, such as TCP, and are therefore in turn delay-sensitive 
as well. For such applications, it is well known that the level 
of traffic perturbation caused by the mix network must be 
carefully chosen in order to not unduly affect delay and 
throughput requirements of the applications. For the 
designer of the anonymity system, this results in a trade-
off between the anonymity degree [2], [3], [4] and quality­
of-service (QoS). 
Although significant efforts have been put forth in 
researching anonymous communication since Chaum, only 
recently have systematic studies appeared to quantitatively 
capture the effect of traffic perturbation on the anonymity in 
realistic settings. It is, therefore, difficult to assess the 
improvement of anonymity that one attains for any given 
cost in form of added latency and perturbation to traffic 
streams. Moreover, few quantitative guidelines exist on 
how different perturbation mechanisms perform. 
This paper focuses on the quantitative evaluation of mix 
performance. We focus our analysis on a particular type of 
attack, which we call the flow-correlation attack. In general, 
flow-correlation attacks attempt to reduce the anonymity 
degree by estimating the path of flows through the mix 
network. Flow correlation analyzes the traffic on a set of 
links (observation points) inside the network and estimates 
the likelihood for each link to be on the path of the flow 
under consideration. An adversary analyzes the network 
traffic with the intention of identifying which of several 
output ports a flow at an input port of a mix is taking. 
Obviously, flow correlation helps the adversary identify the 
path of a flow and consequently reveal other critical 
information related to the flow (e.g., sender and receiver). 
Our major contributions are summarized as follows: 
1.	 We formally model the behavior of an adversary 
who launches flow-correlation attacks. In order to 
successfully identify the path taken by a particular 
flow, the attacker measures the dependency of 
traffic flows. Two classes of correlation methods 
are considered, namely time-domain methods and 
frequency-domain methods. In the time domain, for 
example, statistical information about rate distribu­
tions is collected and used to identify the traffic 
dependency. Similarly, in the frequency domain, we  
identify traffic similarities by comparing the Fourier 
spectra of timing data. Our experiments indicate that 
mixes with many currently used batching strategies 
are weak against flow-correlation attacks, in the 
sense that attackers can easily determine the path 
taken by a protected flow. 
2.	 We measure the effectiveness of a number of popular 
mix strategies in countering flow-correlation attacks. 
Mixes with any tested batching strategy may fail 
under flow-correlation attacks in the sense that, for a 
given flow over an input link, the adversary can 
effectively detect which output link is used by the 
same flow. We use detection rate, the probability that 
the adversary correctly correlates flows into and out 
of a mix, defined as the measure of success for the 
attack. We will show that, given a sufficient amount of 
data, known mix strategies fail; that is, the attack 
achieves close to 100 percent detection rate. This 
remains true even in batching strategies that sacrifice 
QoS (such as a significant TCP goodput reduction) in 
favor of security. 
3.	 While many mix strategies rely on other mechanisms 
in addition to batching alone, it is important to 
understand the vulnerabilities of batching. In fact, 
for a given accuracy of the collected data, the 
effectiveness of such attacks depends primarily on 
the amount of collected data, i.e., on the length of the 
observation interval. In our experiments, we illus­
trate this dependency between attack effectiveness 
for various batching strategies and the amount of 
data at hand. These results should guide designers 
of anonymous communication systems in the in­
formed choice of strategy parameters, such as for 
striping or for path rerouting [5]. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 outlines our Mix 
network model, threat model, and a formal definition of the 
problem. Batching strategies used by existing mix networks 
are also discussed in this section. Section 4 introduces traffic 
analysis methodologies that may be deployed by an 
adversary. We consider both time-domain and frequency-
domain traffic analysis methods. In Section 5, we evaluate the 
performance of mix batching strategies in terms of detection 
rate and FTP goodput. We also examine the performance of 
large collections of mixes (so-called mix networks). The 
effectiveness of the described flow-correlation attacks de­
pends on how packet rates are sampled. In Section 6, we 
empirically compare the effectiveness of the attacks for 
different sampling intervals and theoretically derive optimal 
intervals. 
We conclude the paper and discuss the future work in 
Section 7. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Chaum [1] pioneered the idea of anonymous communica­
tion in 1981. Since then, researchers have applied the idea to 
different applications such as message-based e-mail and 
flow-based low-latency communications, and they have 
developed new defense techniques as more attacks have 
been proposed. 
For anonymous e-mail applications, Chaum [1] proposed 
using relay servers, called mixes, which encrypt and reroute 
messages. An encrypted message is analogous to an onion 
constructed by a sender, who sends the onion to the first mix: 
1.	 Using its private key, the first mix peels off the first 
layer, which is encrypted using the public key of the 
first mix. 
2.	 Inside the first layer is the second mix’s address and 
the rest of the onion, which is encrypted with the 
second mix’s public key. 
3.	 After getting the second mix’s address, the first mix 
forwards the peeled onion to the second mix. This 
process repeats all the way to the receiver. 
4.	 The core part of the onion is the receiver’s address 
and the real message to be sent to the receiver by the 
last mix. 
Chaum proposed return address and digital pseudonyms 
for users to communicate with each other anonymously. 
Low-latency anonymous communication can be further 
divided into systems using core mix networks and those 
using peer-to-peer networks. In a system using a core mix 
network, users connect to a pool of mixes, which provide 
anonymous communication, and users select a forwarding 
path through this core network to the receiver. Onion 
routing [6], Freedom [7], and—most prominently—TOR [8] 
belong to this category. In a system using a peer-to-peer 
network, every node in the network is a mix, but it can also 
be a sender and receiver. Obviously, a peer-to-peer mix 
network can be very large and may provide better 
anonymity in the case when many participants use the 
anonymity service and enough traffic is generated around 
the network. Crowds [9], Tarzan [10], MorphMix [11], and P 5 
[12] belong to this category. 
This paper is interested in the study of passive traffic 
analysis attacks against low-latency anonymous commu­
nication systems. Sun et al. [13] give a quantitative analysis 
for identifying a web page despite the use of encryption and 
anonymizing proxies. The authors take advantage of the fact 
that a number of HTTP features, such as the number and size 
of objects, can be used as signatures to identify web pages 
with some accuracy. Unless the anonymizer addresses this, 
these signatures are visible to the adversary. Serjantov and 
Sewell [14] analyzed the possibility of a lone flow along an 
input link of a mix. If the rate of this lone input flow is 
roughly equal to the rate of a flow out of the mix, this pair of 
input flow and outflow flow are correlated. They also briefly 
discussed some of the possible traffic features used to trace a 
flow. In [15], Wright et al. analyze passive logging attacks on 
anonymous communication networks. 
Attacks on low-latency anonymity networks can be 
classified into two categories, depending on whether they 
have access to the information about individual flows in the 
network or not. The attacks belonging to the first category 
assume that timing information about individual flows is 
available either from compromised mix nodes [16] or from a 
corrupt server [17]. The attacks proposed in the second 
category aim to match a known traffic flow with sets of 
aggregate flows, typically aggregate traffic through two or 
more outgoing ports. Danezis’s attack [18] on continuous-
time mix belongs to this category. Danezis proposed using 
likelihood ratios to detect a flow in aggregate traffic. To 
calculate the likelihood ratios, the adversaries need to know 
the information of cross traffic. The attacks we will present 
later in this paper belong to the second category. The 
proposed attack relies on the dependency between the flow 
of interest and aggregate flows containing the flow of 
interest. In comparison with Danezis’s attack [18], the attacks 
proposed in this paper do not require information about 
cross traffic. In addition, we will show how these attacks 
remain effective in the presence of large amounts of noise. 
Two recent attacks on large-scale anonymity networks 
illustrate the effectiveness of traffic analysis in practice. In 
[17], Murdoch and Danezis stage an active attack to trace 
back connections from a server to the victim client by 
modulating the traffic to the victim at the server and by 
remotely “sensing” the modulation by probind its inter­
ference on cross traffic that is generated by one or more 
corrupt Tor nodes. Similarly, Øverlier and Syverson [19], 
[20] describe how to locate hidden servers in the Tor 
network with the use of a corrupt Tor node and a client 
node. It is pointed out that all Tor nodes are volunteer 
peers; it is easy to add corrupt nodes to the network. 
With the realization that attacks on anonymity networks 
are varied, easy to deploy, and effective, attention has started 
to focus on trying to understand the fundamental capabilities 
of anonymity infrastructures. Kesdogan et al. [21] use 
information-theoretic arguments to quantify limitations on 
the attack resistance of mix networks. Similarly, Zhu and 
Bettati [4] quantify the effect of imperfect mix implementa­
tions using information-theoretic means. Camenisch and 
Lysyanskaya [22] give a cryptographic definition of onion 
routing, which in turn allows the construction of secure 
onion routing schemes. 
Correlation-based traffic analysis schemes are applicable 
beyond anonymity networks. For example, traffic analysis 
has been successfully applied to identify and locate 
Fig. 1. A single mix. 
stepping stones [23], [24], [25]. Most of these traffic analysis 
approaches are timing based. Similarly, Suh et al. use traffic 
correlation in the time domain to identify Skype relay nodes 
at the boundary of campus network settings [26]. Active 
approaches based on embedding watermark into traffic 
flows are proposed to detect stepping stones in [24], [25]. 
3 MODELS 
3.1 Mix and Mix Network 
A mix is a relay device for anonymous communication. 
Fig. 1 shows a situation where users communicate using a 
single mix. such a single mix can achieve a certain level of 
communication anonymity: The sender of a message 
attaches the receiver address to a packet and encrypts it 
using the mix’s public key. Upon receiving a packet, a mix 
decodes the packet. Different from an ordinary router, a 
mix usually will not relay the received packet immediately. 
Rather, it collects several packets and then sends them out 
in a batch. The order of packets may be altered as well. 
Techniques such as batching and reordering are simple 
means to perturb the timing behavior of packets across a 
mix, which in turn is considered necessary for mixes to 
prevent timing-based attacks. More sophisticated perturba­
tion techniques, such as continuous mixes, have been 
recently described, but have been shown to be susceptible 
to flow-correlation attacks as well [27]. The main objective 
of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of mixes against 
a special class of timing-based attacks. Some mix networks 
(most notably maybe Tor) do not explicitly batch packets at 
the mixes, but rather perturb traffic patterns implicitly by 
running TCP-style feedback-based protocols between 
mixes. In this paper, we limit our attention to mix 
networks with explicit batching. 
A mix network, such as Onion Routing network or Tor 
Network, consists of multiple mixes that are interconnected 
by a network. Such a mix network may provide enhanced 
anonymity, as payload packets may go through multiple 
mixes. Since the end-to-end performance of any mix 
network eventually relies on the performance of its 
individual mixes, the analysis of the single mix provides a 
foundation for analyzing the end-to-end performance of 
mix networks. We discuss in detail how to extend our work 
to larger and complicated mix networks in [28]. In fact, if we 
view a mix network (for example, any portion of a Tor 
network [8]) as one super mix, the analytical techniques in 
this paper can be directly applied. 
3.2 Batching Strategies for a Mix 
Batching strategies are designed to prevent not only simple 
timing analysis attacks, but also powerful trickle attacks, 
TABLE 1  
Batching Strategies [30]  
flood attacks, and many other forms of attacks [29], [30]. 
Serjantov et al. [30] summarizes seven batching strategies 
that have been proposed. We will evaluate each of these 
strategies. Our results show that these strategies may not 
work under certain timing analysis attacks. These seven 
batching strategies are listed in Table 1, in which batching 
strategies from s1 to s4 are denoted as simple mixes, while 
batching strategies from s5 to s7 are denoted as pool mixes. 
From Table 1, we can see that the sending of a batch of 
packets can be triggered by certain events, e.g., queue 
length reaching a predefined threshold, a timer having a 
time-out, or some combination of these two. 
Batching is typically accompanied by reordering. In this 
paper, the attacks focus on the traffic characteristics. As 
reordering does not significantly change packet interarrival 
times for mixes that use batching, these attacks (and our 
analysis thereof) are unaffected by reordering. Thus, our 
results are applicable to systems that use any kind of 
reordering methods. More precisely, reorderings are in all 
cases caused by packets being delayed by the batcher, and can 
therefore be handled by modifying the batching algorithm 
accordingly. In this paper, we deal with a large class of 
batching strategies, and the rest have (such as the Continuous 
Mix [18]) been discussed by others. As such, in the rest of this 
paper, we will not discuss reordering techniques further. 
Any of the batching strategies can be implemented in 
two ways: 
Link-Based Batching. With this method, each output 
link has a separate queue. A newly arrived packet is put 
into a queue depending on its destination (and hence the 
link associated with the queue). Once a batch is ready from 
a particular queue (per the batching strategy), the packets 
are taken out of the queue and transmitted over the 
corresponding link. 
Mix-Based Batching. In this way, the entire mix has only 
one queue. The selected batching strategy is applied to this 
queue. That is, once a batch is ready (per the batching 
strategy),  the packets  are taken  out the queue and  
transmitted over links based on the packets’ destination. 
Each of these two methods has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. The control of link-based batching is 
distributed inside the mix and hence may have good 
efficiency. On the other hand, mix-based batching uses only 
one queue and hence is easier to manage. We consider both 
methods in this paper. 
3.3 Threat Model 
In this paper, we assume that the adversary uses a classical 
timing analysis attack [31], [32], which we summarize as 
follows: 
We assume a partially global adversary, who can observe 
some (i.e., wherever he can place a monitoring point) but 
not necessarily all links of a mix network. We also assume 
that the mix nodes of interest are not compromised (as 
opposed to, for example, Levine et al.’s work [16]) but 
maybe other nodes are, and that the adversary is interested 
in breaking the anonymity provided by the mix network. 
The adversary collects the packet interarrival times, and 
analyzes them. This type of attack is passive, since traffic is 
not actively altered (by, say, dropping, inserting, and/or 
modifying packets during a communication session), and is 
therefore very difficult to detect. This type of attack can be 
easily staged on wired and wireless links [33] by a variety of 
agents that have access to the network infrastructure, such 
as malicious ISPs or governments [34]. The inherently 
distributed nature of many anonymity networks makes it 
easy to access such information. For example, malicious Tor 
nodes can be used as traffic monitoring points inside the 
network. We assume that the traffic characteristic of the 
flow under consideration (the input flow) is known. This can 
be the case, for example, when the flow traffic characteristic 
is indeed observable on a link either inside or at the edge of 
the mix network. We assume that the input flow is a single 
flow that cannot be split further. 
The Mix network topology and the general Mix 
strategies are known to the adversary. This is a natural 
assumption for many overlay mix networks. As we will 
point out in the following, there is no need for the attacker 
to know the detailed perturbation scheme used in the Mix, 
as our flow-correlation schemes work for just about any 
Mix, such as timed and batched mixes, and pooled and 
stop-and-go mixes. This is in contrast to Danezis’ elegant 
attack to the Continuous Mix [18], which relies on the 
pairwise independence of packet timings across flows, 
which is not the case in most Mixes. 
The adversary cannot correlate (based on packet timing, 
content, or size) a packet on a input link to another packet 
on the output link. Packet correlation based on packet 
timing is prevented by batching, and correlation based on 
content and packet size is prevented by encryption and 
packet padding, respectively. 
To simplify the following discussion, we assume that the 
traffic in the mix network is not padded with any dummy 
traffic in addition to that naturally generated by the other 
users in the network. Some of the modern anonymous 
communication systems such as Tor [8], do not use dummy 
traffic because of its heavy consumption of bandwidth and 
the general lack of understanding of to what extent exactly 
dummy packets contribute to anonymity. Rather, they rely 
on naturally occurring cross traffic. 
Given the threat model described above, we formulate 
the Flow-Correlation Problem as follows: Given a description 
of a flow of interest at the input of a Mix, and a number of 
flows of indistinguishable packets at the outputs of the Mix, 
which output link contains the flow of interest? In other 
words, we assume that the specific objective of the 
adversary is to identify the output link of a traffic flow 
that appears on an input link. Others have described similar 
attacks but under simplified circumstances. Serjantov and 
Sewell [14], for example, assume that the flow under attack 
is alone on a link thus making its traffic characteristics 
immediately visible to the attacker. In this paper, we 
consider flows inside (potentially large) aggregates, thus 
making the attack rather generally applicable. 
4 TRAFFIC FLOW CORRELATION TECHNIQUES 
This section discusses the traffic flow-correlation techniques 
that may be used by the adversary either to correlate 
senders and receivers directly or to greatly reduce the 
searching time for such a correlation in a mix network. 
4.1 Overview 
Recall that the adversary’s objective is to correlate an 
incoming flow to an output link at a Mix. We call this flow 
correlation. This flow-correlation attack is harmful in a 
variety of situations. For example, in the single-mix scenario 
depicted in Fig. 1, the adversary can discover whom sender 
(say, S1) is talking to (R1 or R2 in this case) by correlating 
the output traffic at the Mix to S1’s traffic despite cross 
traffic from S2 or other senders. In a mix network, the 
adversary can easily reconstruct the path of the connection 
by combining measurements and results of flow correlation 
either at the network boundaries or within the network. 
This section discusses the attack in more detail. Fig. 2 
shows a flowchart of the typical procedure which the 
adversary may use to perform flow correlation. We now 
describe each step in detail. 
Fig. 2. Typical flowchart for flow correlation. 
Step 1: Data Collection. We assume that the adversary is 
able to collect information about all the packets on both 
input and output links. For each collected packet, the arrival 
time is recorded using tools such as tcpdump [35] or Cisco’s 
NetFlow [36]. We assume that all the packets are encrypted 
and padded to the same size, and hence, only the arrival 
time is of interest. The arrival times of packets at input link i 
form a time series 
Ai ¼ ðai;1; . . . ; ai;rÞ; ð1Þ 
where ai;k is the kth packet’s arrival time at input link i, and 
r is the size of the sample collected during a given sampling 
interval. Similarly, the arrival times of packets at output link 
j form a time series 
Bj ¼ ðbj;1; . . . ; bj;sÞ; ð2Þ 
where bj;k is the kth packet’s arrival time at output link j, 
and s is the size of the sample collected during a given 
sampling interval. The packets come out from mixes in 
batches. We select sampling interval that is usually much 
longer than the duration of a batch. Hence, a sampling 
interval typically contains many batches. We make the 
simplifying assumption that the traffic characteristic of the 
flow under consideration (the input flow) is known. This can 
be the case, for example, when the flow traffic characteristic 
is indeed observable on a link either inside or at the edge of 
the mix network. 
Step 2: Flow Pattern Vector Extraction. With the above 
notation, the strategy of the adversary is to analyze the time 
series Ais and Bjs in order to determine if there is any 
dependency between an input flow and an output flow of 
the mix. However, a direct analysis over these time series 
will not be effective. They need to be transformed into so-
called pattern vectors that can facilitate further analysis. We 
have found that effective transformation depends on 
batching strategies utilized by the mix. In Section 4.2, we 
will discuss specific definitions of transformations for 
different batching strategies. Currently, for the convenience 
of discussion, let us assume that Ai is transformed into 
pattern vector Xi ¼ ðxi;1; . . . ; xi;qÞ. And time series Bj is 
transformed into Yj ¼ ðyj;1; . . . ; yj;qÞ. Note, here the two 
pattern vectors have the same length. 
Step 3: Distance Function Selection. We define the 
distance function dðXi; YjÞ, which measures the “distance” 
between an input flow at input link i and the traffic at 
output link j. The smaller the distance, the more likely the 
flow on an input link is correlated to the corresponding 
flow on the output link. Clearly, the definition of the 
distance function is the key in the correlation analysis. 
Section 4.3 will discuss two effective distance functions: one 
is based on mutual information and the other is based on 
the frequency-spectrum-based matched filter. 
Step 4: Flow Correlation. Once the distance function has 
been defined between an input flow and an output link, we 
can easily carry out the correlation analysis by selecting the 
output link whose traffic has the minimum distance to 
input flow pattern vector Xi. 
4.2 Flow Pattern Vector Extraction 
Once the data are collected, the relevant pattern vectors 
must be extracted. Recall that batching strategies in Table 1 
can be classified into two classes: threshold-triggered 
batching (s1, s3, and s5)
1 and timer-triggered batching (s2, 
s4, s6, and s7). The packet timing characteristics at the 
output link allows for targeted feature extraction for these 
different classes of batching. 
For threshold-triggered batching strategies, packets 
leave the mix in batches. Hence, the interarrival time of 
packets in a batch is determined by the link bandwidth, 
which is independent of the input flow. Thus, the useful 
information to the adversary is the number of packets in a 
batch and the time that elapses between two batches. 
Normalizing this relationship, we define the elements in 
pattern vector Yj as follows: 
Number of packets in batch k in the sampling interval 
Yj;k ¼ : ðEnding time of batch kÞ-ðEnding time of batch k-1Þ 
ð3Þ 
For timer-triggered batching strategies, a batch of 
packets is sent whenever a timer fires. The length of the 
time interval between two consecutive timer events is a 
predefined constant. Thus, following a similar argument 
made for the threshold-triggered batching strategies, we 
define the elements in pattern vector Yj as follows: 
Number of packets in the kth time-out interval
 
Yj;k ¼
 ðtime of kth time-outÞ-ðtime of ðk- 1Þst time-outÞ 
ð4Þ 
Number of packets in the kth time out interval ¼ : ð5Þ 
Predefined inter-time-out length 
For the traffic without batching (i.e., the baseline strategy 
s0 defined in Table 1), we use similar methods defined for 
timer-triggered batching strategies as shown in (5). 
The basic idea in the methods for extraction of pattern 
vectors is to partition a sampling interval into multiple 
subintervals and to calculate the average traffic rate in each 
subinterval as the values of the elements of traffic pattern 
vectors. The above two methods differ on how to partition 
the interval, depending on which batching strategy is used 
by the mix. We take a similar approach to extract pattern 
vectors Xis corresponding to Yjs. Again, the specific 
method of subinterval partition depends on how the mix 
is batching the packets. 
1. Strategy s3 could also be classified as timer-triggered. However, we 
treat it as threshold-triggered because it may send out a batch when the 
number of packets received by the mix has reached the threshold. 
4.3 Distance Functions 
The feature vectors are correlated using distance functions. 
In  the following, we consider  two  kinds of distance  
functions: the first is based on a comparison of mutual 
information and the second on frequency analysis. The 
motivation and computation methods are given below. 
4.3.1 Mutual Information 
Mutual information is an information theoretical measure 
of the dependence of two random variables.2 In our 
scenario, we can view the pattern vectors that represent 
the input and output flows as samples of random variables. 
If we consider the pattern vectors Xi and Yj to be each a 
sample of the random variables X i and Yj, respectively, 
then fðXi;1; Yj;1Þ; . . .  ; ðXi;q; Yj;qÞg correspond to a sample of 
the joint random variable ðX i;YjÞ. With these definitions, 
the distance dðXi; YjÞ between pattern vectors Xi and Yj 
should be approximately inversely proportional to the 
mutual information IðX i;YjÞ between X i and Yj, 
1 1 
dðXi; YjÞ ¼  ¼ - R R  : ð6Þ pðxi;yjÞIðX i;YiÞ pðxi; yjÞ log pðxiÞpðyjÞ 
In order to compute the mutual information IðX i;YiÞ, we  
need to estimate the marginal distributions (pðxiÞ and pðyjÞ) 
and their joint distribution pðxi; yjÞ. In the following, we use 
a histogram-based estimation of mutual information 
I^ðX i;YjÞ of continuous distributions [37], which is given 
as follows: 
XKuv Kuvq
I^ðX i;YjÞ  log ; ð7Þ 
u;v 
q Ku:K:v 
where K represents the histogram, q is the sample size, i.e., 
the length of pattern vector Xi and Yj. The sample space is a 
two-dimensional plane divided into U x V equally sized 
6X x6Y cells with coordinates ðu; vÞ. Kuv is the number of 
samples in the bin ðu; vÞ. 6X and 6Y have to be carefully 
chosen for an optimal estimation. 
4.3.2 Frequency Analysis 
For timer-triggered batching strategies, we use FFT3 or 
Wavelet on the sample Xi and Yj to obtain the frequency 
spectrum XF and Y F Then, we apply matched filteri j . 
method over Xi
F and Yj
F . We take advantage of the fact that 
frequency components of the input flow traffic carry on to 
the aggregate flows at the output link. Matched filter is an 
optimal filter to detect a signal buried in noise. It is optimal 
in the sense that it can provide the maximum signal-to­
noise ratio at its output for a given signal. In particular, by 
directly applying the theory of matched filters, we can 
define the distance function dðXi; YjÞ as the inverse matched 
filter detector MðXiF ; YjF Þ, 
2. Entropy, an information theoretical measure of uncertainty, was 
proposed to measure anonymity degree of anonymity networks in [2], [3]. 
In [4], we proposed to use mutual information as a measure of anonymity 
degree. Entropy is used to measure uncertainty of one random variable and 
mutual information is used to measure the dependency between two 
random variables. 
3. Frequency analysis has been applied to traffic analysis before, e.g., in 
[38]. 
Fig. 3. Experiment setup. 
1 1 
dðXi; YjÞ ¼  ( ) ¼ ; ð8Þ 
XF <X
F ;Y F>i j 
kY F k 
M i ; Yj
F 
j 
where <XF ; Yj
F> is the inner product of XF and Y F , andi i j qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ    Y F ¼ <Y F ; Y F :j j j > 
5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION 
We evaluate in a testbed, the effectiveness of a selection of 
batching strategies (listed in Table 1) for a mix under our 
flow-correlation attacks. These experiments illustrate that 
all analyzed batching strategies largely fail under the 
attacks described here. In addition, they impose signifi­
cant cost on applications, for example, by reducing TCP 
flow performance. 
5.1 Experiment Network Setup 
Fig. 3 shows our experimental testbed. The Mix control 
module that performs the batching and reordering func­
tions is integrated into Linux’s firewall system [39] using 
Netfilter; we use a set of firewall rules to specify what traffic 
should be protected. Traditional Linux kernels have a 
10 msec timer granularity, which makes an high-fidelity 
implementation of timer-based batching strategies difficult. 
We use a version of Linux (Timesys/Real Time Linux [40]) 
that guarantees highly accurate timer behavior (maximum 
timer latency around 50 fsec). Two delay boxes D1 and D2 
emulate the Internet propagation delay on different paths. 
Our experiments reported here focus on TCP flows 
because of their prevalence in the Internet. However, the 
results are generally applicable to many other kinds of flows 
that either use TCP-like congestion control mechanisms or 
otherwise display strong timing “footprints” due to, for 
example, user dynamics. VoIP flows or sessions with “short” 
HTTP connections are instances of the latter. Given the same 
amount data, they are in general easier to correlate than the 
long-lasting TCP connections analyzed in this paper. 
The traffic flows in our experiments are configured as 
follows: An FTP client on node R2 downloads a file from the 
FTP server on S2. We call this traffic flow the flow of interest. 
In our experiments, this flow carries packets at a rate of 
100 packets per second (pps). The traffic from S1 to R2 serves 
as the random noise traffic to the FTP client. The traffic from 
node S1 to node R1 is the cross traffic through mix M from 
the perspective of the FTP flow. We adjust the rate of cross 
traffic and of the noise traffic so that the traffic rate on both 
output links of the mix are approximately 500 pps. The 
objective of the adversary in this experiment is to identify 
the output link that carries the FTP flow. 
5.2 Metrics 
We use detection rate as a measure of the ability of the mix to 
protect anonymity. Detection rate here is defined as the ratio 
of the number of correct detections to the number of attempts. 
While the detection rate measures the effectiveness of the mix 
(the lower the detection rate, the more effective the mix), we 
measure its efficiency in terms of QoS perceived by the 
applications. We use FTP goodput as an indication of FTP QoS. 
FTP goodput is defined as the rate at which the FTP client R2 
receives data from the FTP server S2. Low levels of FTP 
goodput indicate that the mix in the given configuration is 
poorly applicable for low-latency flow-based mix networks. 
5.3 Performance Evaluation 
5.3.1 Effectiveness of Batching Strategies 
Fig. 4 shows the detection rate for systems using a link-
based batching strategy. Fig. 5 shows the detection rate for 
systems using a mix-based batching strategy as a function 
of the number of packets observed. A sample may include 
both FTP packets and cross traffic packets while FTP 
packets account for less than 20 percent of the number 
(sample size) of packets. Parameters in the legends of these 
Fig. 4. Detection rate for link-based batching. (a) Mutual information. (b) Matched filter. 
Fig. 5. Detection rate for mix-based batching. (a) Mutual information. (b) Matched filter. 
Fig. 6. FTP goodput. (a) Link-based batching. (b) Mix-based batching. 
figures are listed in the same order as in Table 1. Based on 
these results, we make the following observations: 
1.	 For all the strategies, the detection rate monotonically 
increases with increasing amount of available data. 
The detection rate approaches 100 percent when the 
sample size is sufficiently large. This is consistent 
with intuition, as more data imply that there is more 
information about the input flow, which in turn 
improves the detection rate. In this set of experi­
ments, the detection rate for random guesses is 0.5. 
2.	 Different strategies display different resistances to 
flow-correlation attacks. A number of observations 
contradict intuition: a) The simple proxy strategy s0 
performs comparatively well in terms of countering 
the attack. b) Some researchers in previous studies 
argued that pool mixes (strategies s5 -s7) perform 
better than simple mixes (strategies s1-s4) in mes­
sage-based mix networks. Our results empirically 
show that this argument does not hold for low-
latency flow-based mix networks. With our current 
parameter setting, the best pool batching strategy, 
timed dynamic-pool mix (strategy s7) for message-
based mix networks is almost the worst one for low-
latency flow-based mix networks under the attack 
using mutual information. One of the reasons for 
these nonintuitive results is that batching introduces 
more dynamics into TCP flows and makes each TCP 
flow’s features stand out compared with the back­
ground traffic. 
3.	 Frequency-analysis-based distance functions typi­
cally outperform mutual-information-based distance 
functions in terms of detection rate. For many 
batching strategies, the former performs significantly 
better. This is because the frequency-based analysis is 
resilient to phasing. Therefore, lack of synchroniza­
tion between data collected at input and output ports 
has some effect on the effectiveness of the attack. 
4.	 We do not find a significant difference between link-
based and mix-based batching. 
Overall, our data show that the mix using any of 
batching strategies s1; s2; . . . ; s7 fails under the flow-
correlation attacks. One of the reasons is that TCP flows 
often demonstrate interesting patterns, such as periodicity 
of rate change and burstiness, in particular, when the TCP 
loop-control mechanism is triggered by excessive traffic 
perturbation in the mixes. Figs. 4 and 5 show that flow-
correlation attacks can well explore this pattern difference 
between TCP flows. 
5.3.2 Efficiency of Batching Strategies 
As batching delays packets, one should expect that the 
overall performance (in terms of throughput) of TCP 
connections will be impacted by the mixes along their path. 
Fig. 6 quantitatively shows the degradation of FTP goodput 
for a mix using different batching strategies. 
In Fig. 6, we compare FTP goodput between a simple 
proxy strategy (s0) and other batching strategies 
(s1; s2; . . . ; s7). We still use the network setup described in 
Fig. 3. Similar to the experiments above, we configure the 
noise traffic from S1 to R2 to carry 400 pps, and the cross 
traffic from S1 to R1 to carry 500 pps. Together with the 
100 pps carried by the flow of interest from S2 to R2, both 
TABLE 2  
Nist-Net Parameters  
output links of the mix carry 500 pps. Based on the 
experiments and the results illustrated in Fig. 6, we make 
the following observations: 
1.	 FTP goodput is decreased because of the use of 
batching. 
2.	 Different batching strategies have different impact on 
the FTP goodput. In general, pool batching strategies 
(strategies S5 -s7) cause a worse FTP goodput than 
simple batching strategies (strategies s1 -s4). 
3.	 When the batching in the mixes is excessively 
aggressive, that is, when batching intervals are too 
long or threshold values too high, the batching 
interferes with the time-out behavior of TCP and 
FTP, and in some cases, FTP aborts. This is the case, 
in particular, for threshold-triggered mixes with no 
cross traffic. 
5.4 Network Emulation through Nist-Net 
In this set of experiments, the delay boxes in Fig. 3 are 
replaced by Nist-Net nodes [41] to emulate the effect of a 
real network situation. The Nist-Net parameters are listed 
in Table 2. The parameters for the Nist-Net nodes D1 and 
D2 were gathered from statistics of ping packet traces from 
Cleveland State University to ftp.linux.ncsu.edu and to 
mirror.linux.duke.edu, respectively. The flow of interest is 
limited to about 100 packet per second by Nist-Net. 
Fig. 7 shows the detection rate for emulated networks 
using the detection method based on mutual information. 
We can observe that flow-correlation attacks approach a 
100 percent detection rate when the sample size is 
sufficiently large. 
5.5 Mixes in Networks with Packet Losses 
In this set of experiments, we study the impact of dropped 
packets on flow-correlation attacks. Such packet loss can 
occur in overloaded networks or in wireless settings where 
environmental interference can cause packets to be dropped. 
The packet-drop behavior is defined by controlling the 
packet-drop probability in the Nist-Net nodes in Fig. 3. 
Fig. 8 shows the detection rate when the network is 
dropping packets. The mix strategy used in this set of 
experiments is <s7; 10; 0:01; 10; 0:5>, that  is,  a timed  
dynamic-pool Mix with pool size 10, batch size 10, batch 
interval 10 msec, and forwarding probability 0.5. Based on 
the results, we make the following observations: 
1.	 The detection rate still approaches 100 percent when 
the sample size is sufficiently large. 
2.	 The results for small drop rates (5 percent or less) 
appear to be no different than for no packet drops 
at all. As expected, for larger drop rates (more than 
5 percent) the detection rate is higher than for 
lower drop rates. The reason for this is that a large 
number of packet drops makes the timing footprint 
of the TCP dynamics more obvious. 
5.6 Mix Networks 
Fig. 9 shows the network setup in this experiment. The 
center part of the topologies used in experiments is the mix 
cascade of different number of layers. Each sender on the 
left side has four flows traversing the mix network. We 
arrange paths of traffic flows so that each link in the cascade 
has some number of traffic flows. To simulate the cross 
traffic in the mix network, four larger aggregates of flows 
are added to the mix network. According to the self-similar 
nature of the network traffic [42], the high-volume cross 
traffic is Pareto distributed. The configuration of the flows 
through the six-layer cascade is shown in Table 3. 
Fig. 10 shows the detection rate for topologies based on 
mix cascades of different layers. We can observe that when 
the sample size is sufficiently large, the detection rate 
approaches 100 percent. In this set of experiments, the 
detection rate for random guess is 1 since there are eight 8 
potential receivers. So, even for small sample size such as 
Fig. 7. Detection rate for emulated networks (mix-based batching) using  
mutual information. Fig. 8. Detection rate for network with packet loss.  
Fig. 9. Experiment setup of mix network (six layers). 
600 packets, flow-correlation attacks performs better than 
random guess. We can also observe that the detection rate 
of the topology of two-stage cascade is lower than other 
topologies. The reason is that more layers of mix cascade 
may make timing footprint of the TCP dynamics more 
obvious. 
6 SAMPLING INTERVAL SELECTION 
6.1 Theoretical Proof and Empirical Validation 
From the discussion in Section 4.3 and from the evaluation 
results above, we can see that frequency-analysis-based 
flow-correlation attacks are very effective. The effectiveness 
of the attack greatly depends on the careful selection of the 
sampling interval, since we calculate the Fourier spectrum 
over a set of packet average rates (i.e., the flow feature 
vector) in the sampling interval. In this section, we discuss 
how to select the sampling interval T in order to maximize 
the effectiveness of flow-correlation attacks. We still use 
FTP as an example for the discussion. 
TABLE 3  
Flow Configuration (Six Layers)  
Fig. 10. Detection rate for topologies of different layers. 
Lemma 6.1. An FTP flow with round trip time RTT has a 
frequency component with the maximum power density at 
1=RTT . This frequency component is denoted as the Feature 
Frequency of the FTP flow. (Proof in the Appendix.) 
The basic idea is that FTP uses a loop-control mechanism. 
For most of the life time, an FTP flow acts on the information 
collected in each round trip time and thus demonstrates a 
strong periodicity at the round trip time RTT. 
Based on Lemma 6.1, we have the following theory for 
the selection of sampling interval: 
Theorem 6.2. Assuming that a stable FTP flow on the input link 
of a mix has a round trip time RTT , to detect the output link of 
this FTP flow, we need to choose a sampling interval T smaller 
than or equal to RTT=2, i.e., 
RTT 
T < : ð9Þ 
2 
Proof. When we do sampling and calculate the average rate 
of an FTP flow during the sampling interval, the process 
corresponds to a zero-order hold [43] sampling process. 
From Lemma 6.1, we know that an FTP flow’s feature 
frequency is at 1=RTT , which we have to preserve for the 
best effectiveness of flow-correlation attack. Nyquist’s 
sampling theorem [43] tells us that to preserve this 
feature frequency, the sampling rate 1=T should be at 
least two times the feature frequency. That is, 




T < : 
2 
ut 
Approximately, we can apply Theorem 6.2 to all the 
strategies. Figs. 11 and 12 show detection rate in terms of 
sampling interval. RTT of this FTP flow in question is 
around 300 msec. We can see that the maximum detection 
rate does happens at RTT=2 ¼ 150 msec. 
In practice, we cannot use any sampling interval smaller 
than half of RTT. There exists all kinds of interference from 
mixes and operating systems, which may introduce high-
frequency noise in frequency domain. We, therefore, prefer 
to use a sample interval between ½RTT=4; RTT=2]. In this 
Fig. 11. Detection rate in terms of sampling interval based on Matched Filter. (a) <s0>. (b) <s2; 0:01>. 
Fig. 12. Detection rate in terms of sampling interval based on Mutual Information. (a) <s0>. (b) <s2; 0:01>. 
way, the zero-order hold operator acts as a low-pass filter 
with frequency response " ( )# 
2 T¥f
¥fj2 T 2 sin- 2Hðf; TÞ ¼  e 2 : ð11Þ 
2¥ 
The main lobe of jHðf; TÞj is in the range jf j < 1 . Thus, our T 
sampling process will smooth the original instantaneous 
rate and remove a significant amount of noise. This in turn 
helps the flow-correlation attack. Figs. 11 and 12 show the 
influence of noise on detection rate: when T is much smaller 
than RTT=2, the detection rate deteriorates. 
6.2 Discussion 
In practice, the adversary does not know the exact RTT of 
the special flows in the system. Instead, she may need to a 
priori investigate the mix network and get a rough picture 
of possible TCP flow RTTs. The sampling interval can then 
be chosen to be half of the smallest of the possible RTTs, or 
simply the one that gives the best detection rate. 
Figs. 11 and 12 also illustrate the complicated relationship 
between detection rate and sampling interval: In addition to 
the feature frequency component at 1=RTT , an FTP flow in 
reality contains minor feature frequencies as well, which are 
sufficient to differentiate an FTP flow from others. Fig. 13 
gives an example of a power spectrum of an FTP flow. 
For application-limited flows, such as ssh and much Web 
traffic, the feature frequency is not determined by RTT. 
Instead, it is determined by the application-level dynamics. 
7 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
We have analyzed mix networks in terms of their effective­
ness in providing anonymity and quality-of-service. Various 
methods used in mix networks were considered: seven 
different packet batching strategies and two implementation 
schemes, namely the link-based batching scheme and mix-
based batching scheme. We found that mix networks that use 
traditional batching strategies, regardless of the implemen­
tation scheme, are vulnerable under flow-correlation attacks. 
By using statistical analysis, an adversary can accurately 
determine the output link used by traffic that comes to an 
input flow of a mix. The detection rate can be as high as 
100 percent as long as enough data are available. This is true 
even if heavy cross traffic exists. The data collected in this 
paper should give designers guidelines for the development 
and operation of mix networks. 
The failure of traditional mix batching strategies directly 
leads us to the formulation of a new packet control method for 
mixes in order to overcome their vulnerability to flow-
correlation attacks. Appropriate output control can achieve a 
guaranteed low detection rate while maintaining high 
throughput for normal payload traffic. Our claim is validated 
by extensive performance data collected from experiments. 
Fig. 13. Power spectrum of an FTP flow. 
 Fig. 14. TCP congestion window in congestion avoidance phase. 
We have shown that output control is flexible in controlling 
the overhead by adjusting the maximum packet delay. 
APPENDIX A 
MAXIMUM FREQUENCY COMPONENT OF A TCP FLOW 
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Based on [44], [45], the TCP flow 
dynamics can approximately be illustrated as in Fig. 14 if 
TCP-reno [46] version of congestion control algorithm is 
used. When a TCP flow is in additive increase phase, one 
more packet is sent each round trip time. While in 
multiplicative decrease phase, the packet number in one 
Wround trip time decreases by half from W to . The2 
interdeparture time ( of two adjacent packets is 
determined by the smallest bandwidth along the flow 
path and jitter of queuing delay. Usually, ( is much 
smaller than RTT. 
So, we can model the TCP packet train in congestion 
control phase as 
W Wþk-12 2 X	 X 
xðtÞ ¼  8ðt - l . (- k .RTT Þ; ð12Þ 
k¼0	 l¼0 
where 8ðtÞ is the unit impulse function. 
Its Fourier transformation is 
W Wþk-12 2X	 X -j!ðk.RTTþ .l (ÞXð!Þ ¼  e : ð13Þ 
k¼0	 l¼0 
Its energy-density spectrum is as shown in (14).
 
Since (« RTT , jl- nj <W , and ðl- nÞ(! 0, (14) can be
 
approximated as follows: 
" W W	 #2 
2 2 X	 X 
jXðwÞj2 ¼
þk-1 
cosðk .RTT . !þ l . ( . !Þ
 
k¼0 l¼0
 " # 2
W Wþk-12 2X	 X 
þ sinðk . RTT . !þ l . ( . !Þ 
k¼0	 l¼0 X 
¼ cosðk .RTT . !þ l . ( . !Þ 
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sinðm . RTT . !þ n . ( . !Þ X 
¼ cosðððk-mÞRTT þ ðl- nÞ(Þ!Þ: 








jXðwÞj2 cosððk-mÞ .  RTT . !Þ: ð15Þ 






This corresponds to the case that all packets in one RTT 
are sent out at roughly the same time at the beginning of the 
RTT. When ! ¼ 2¥ h (h is an integer), we get theRTT 
maximum jXðwÞj2 since cosððk-mÞ .  RTT . !Þ ¼  1. 
Thus, the maximum frequency component of an FTP 
1flow is around frequency .RTT 
REFERENCES 
[1]	 D. Chaum, “Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and 
Digital Pseudonyms,” Comm. ACM, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 84-90, Feb. 
1981. 
[2]	 A. Serjantov and G. Danezis, “Towards an Information Theoretic 
Metric for Anonymity,” Proc. Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
Workshop (PET ’02), R. Dingledine and P. Syverson, eds., pp. 41­
53, Apr. 2002. 
[3]	 C. Dı´az, S. Seys, J. Claessens, and B. Preneel, “Towards 
Measuring Anonymity,” Proc. Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
Workshop (PET ’02), R. Dingledine and P. Syverson, eds., pp. 54­
68, Apr. 2002. 
[4]	 Y. Zhu and R. Bettati, “Anonymity vs. Information Leakage in 
Anonymity Systems,” Proc. 25th IEEE Int’l Conf. Distributed 
Computing Systems (ICDCS ’05), pp. 514-524, 2005. 
[5]	 O.R.D. Achives, “Link Padding and the Intersection Attack,” 
http://archives.seul.org/or/dev, 2002. 
[6]	 P.F. Syverson, D.M. Goldschlag, and M.G. Reed, “Anonymous 
Connections and Onion Routing,” Proc. IEEE Symp. Security and 
Privacy, pp. 44-54, 1997. 
[7]	 P. Boucher, A. Shostack, and I. Goldberg, “Freedom Systems 2.0 
Architecture,” http://www.freedom.net/products/whitepapers 
/Freedom_System_2_Architecture.pdf, Dec. 2000. 
[8]	 R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson, “Tor: The Second-
Generation Onion Router,” Proc. 13th USENIX Security Symp., 
pp. 303-320, Aug. 2004. 
[9]	 M.K. Reiter and A.D. Rubin, “Crowds: Anonymity for Web 
Transactions,” ACM Trans. Information and System Security, vol. 1, 
no. 1, pp. 66-92, 1998. 
[10]	 M.J. Freedman and R. Morris, “Tarzan: A Peer-to-Peer Anonymiz­
ing Network Layer,” Proc. Ninth ACM Conf. Computer and Comm. 
Security, pp. 193-206, 2002. 
[11]	 M. Rennhard and B. Plattner, “Introducing MorphMix: Peer-to-
Peer Based Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection,” 
Proc. ACM Workshop Privacy in the Electronic Soc. (WPES ’02), 
pp. 91-102, 2002. 
[12]	 R. Sherwood, B. Bhattacharjee, and A. Srinivasan, “p5: A Protocol 
for Scalable Anonymous Communication,” Proc. IEEE Symp. 
Security and Privacy, pp. 58-70, May 2002. 
[13]	 Q. Sun, D.R. Simon, Y.-M. Wang, W. Russell, V.N. Padmanabhan, 
and L. Qiu, “Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing 
Traffic,” Proc. IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy, pp. 19-30, 2002. 
[14]	 A. Serjantov and P. Sewell, “Passive Attack Analysis for Connec­
tion-Based Anonymity Systems,” Proc. European Symp. Research in 
Computer Security (ESORICS ’03), pp. 116-131, Oct. 2003. 
[15]	 M. Wright, M. Adler, B.N. Levine, and C. Shields, “Defending 
Anonymous Communications against Passive Logging Attacks,” 
Proc. IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy (SP ’03), pp. 28-41, May 
2003. 
[16]	 B.N. Levine, M.K. Reiter, C. Wang, and M.K. Wright, “Timing 
Attacks in Low-Latency Mix-Based Systems,” Proc. Financial 
Cryptography Conf. (FC ’04), pp. 251-265, Feb. 2004. 
[17] S.J. Murdoch and G. Danezis, “Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor,” [45] J. Padhye, V. Firoiu, D.F. Towsley, and J.F. Kurose, “Modeling 
Proc. 2005 IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy, pp. 183-195, May 2005. TCP Throughput: A Simple Model and its Empirical Validation,” 
[18] G. Danezis, “The Traffic Analysis of Continuous-Time Mixes,” Proc. ACM SIGCOMM ’98, pp. 303-314, 1998. 
Proc. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop (PET ’04), pp. 35-50, [46] K. Fall and S. Floyd, “Simulation-Based Comparisons of Tahoe, 
May 2004. Reno and SACK TCP,” SIGCOMM Computer Comm. Rev., vol. 26, 
[19] L. Øverlier and P. Syverson, “Locating Hidden Servers,” Proc. no. 3, pp. 5-21, Aug. 1996. 
IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy, May 2006. 
[20] L. Øverlier and P. Syverson, “Valet Services: Improving Hidden 
Servers with a Personal Touch,” Proc. Sixth Workshop Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies (PET ’06), G. Danezis and P. Golle, eds., 
pp. 223-244, June 2006. 
[21] D. Kesdogan, D. Agrawal, V. Pham, and D. Rautenbach, 
“Fundamental Limits on the Anonymity Provided by the Mix 
Technique,” Proc. IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 86-99, 
2006. 
[22] J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya, “A Formal Treatment of Onion 
Routing,” Proc. Ann. Int’l Cryptology Conf. (CRYPTO ’05), 
V. Shoup, ed., pp. 169-187, Aug. 2005. 
[23] Y. Zhang and V. Paxson, “Detecting Stepping Stones,” Proc. Ninth 
Conf. USENIX Security Symp. (SSYM ’00), pp. 13-13, 2000. 
[24] X. Wang and D.S. Reeves, “Robust Correlation of Encrypted 
Attack Traffic through Stepping Stones by Manipulation of 
Interpacket Delays,” Proc. 10th ACM Conf. Computer and Comm. 
Security (CCS ’03), pp. 20-29, 2003. 
[25] Y.J. Pyun, Y.H. Park, X. Wang, D.S. Reeves, and P. Ning, “Tracing 
Traffic through Intermediate Hosts that Repacketize Flows,” Proc. 
26th IEEE INFOCOM ’07, pp. 634-642, May 2007. 
[26] K. Suh, D.R. Figueiredo, J. Kurose, and D. Towsley, “Characteriz­
ing and Detecting Skype-Relayed Traffic,” Proc. 25th IEEE 
INFOCOM ’06, pp. 1-12, Apr. 2006. 
[27] Y. Zhu, X. Fu, and R. Bettati, “On the Effectiveness of Continuous-
Time Mixes under Flow Correlation Attacks,” Technical Report 
TR2005-2-6, Texas A&M Univ. Computer Science, 2005. 
[28] Y. Zhu, X. Fu, R. Bettati, and W. Zhao, “Anonymity Analysis of 
Mix Networks against Flow-Correlation Attacks,” Proc. IEEE 
GLOBECOM ’05, vol. 3, pp. 1801-1805, 2005. 
[29] G. Danezis, R. Dingledine, and N. Mathewson, “Mixminion: 
Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol,” Proc. 2003 
IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy, pp. 2-15, May 2003. 
[30] A. Serjantov, R. Dingledine, and P. Syverson, “From a Trickle to a 
Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types,” Proc. Information 
Hiding Workshop (IH ’02), F. Petitcolas, ed., pp. 36-52, Oct. 2002. 
[31] X. Fu, B. Graham, R. Bettati, W. Zhao, and D. Xuan, “Analytical 
and Empirical Analysis of Countermeasures to Traffic Analysis 
Attacks,” Proc. 32nd Int’l Conf. Parallel Processing (ICPP ’03), 
pp. 483-492, Oct. 2003. 
[32] D.X. Song, D. Wagner, and X. Tian, “Timing Analysis of 
Keystrokes and Timing Attacks on SSH,” Proc. 10th USENIX 
Security Symp., pp. 337-352, 2001. 
[33] J.D. Howard, “An Analysis of Security Incidents on the Internet 
1989-1995,” CMU dissertation, Technical Report, 1997. 
[34] F.B.I, “Carnivore Diagnostic Tool,” http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/ 
carnivore/carnivore2.htm, 2003. 
[35] tcpdump.org, “tcpdump,” http://www.tcpdump.org/, 2003. 
[36] cisco.inc., “Netflow Services Solutions Guide,” http://www.cisco. 
com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/intsolns/netflsol/nfwhite. 
htm, 2003. 
[37] R. Moddemeijer, “On Estimation of Entropy and Mutual 
Information of Continuous Distributions,” Signal Processing, 
vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 233-246, 1989. 
[38] S.-q. Li and J.D. Pruneski, “The Linearity of Low Frequency Traffic 
Flow: An Intrinsic I/O Property in Queueing Systems,” IEEE/ 
ACM Trans. Networking, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 429-443, June 1997. 
[39] netfilter.org, “Netfilter,” http://netfilter.samba.org/, 2003. 
[40] TimeSys, “Timesys Linux Docs,” http://www.timesys.com/, 
2003. 
[41] M. Carson and D. Santay, “Nist Net: A Linux-Based Network 
Emulation Tool,” ACM SIGCOMM Computer Comm. Rev., vol. 33, 
no. 3, http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=956993.957007, 
pp. 111-126, July 2003. 
[42] K. Park and W. Willinger, “Self-Similar Network Traffic: An 
Overview,” citeseer.ist.psu.edu/park99selfsimilar.html, 1999. 
[43] A.V. Oppenheim, A.S. Willsky, and S.H. Nawab, Signals and 
Systems, second ed. Prentice-Hall, 1997. 
[44] S. Floyd and K. Fall, “Promoting the Use of End-to-End 
Congestion Control in the Internet,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, 
vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 458-472, Aug. 1999. 
